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Tax Amnesties in Africa: An Analysis of the Voluntary Disclosure 
Programme in Uganda 
Solomon Rukundo 
Summary 
Tax amnesties have taken centre stage as a compliance tool in recent years. The OECD 
estimates that since 2009 tax amnesties in 40 jurisdictions have resulted in the collection of 
an additional €102 billion in tax revenue. A number of African countries have introduced tax 
amnesties in the last decade, including Nigeria, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania. Despite 
their global popularity, the efficacy of tax amnesties as a tax compliance tool remains in 
doubt. The revenue is often below expectations, and it probably could have been raised 
through effective use of regular enforcement measures. It is also argued that tax amnesties 
might incentivise non-compliance – taxpayers may engage in non-compliance in the hope of 
benefiting from an amnesty.  
This paper examines the administration of tax amnesties in various jurisdictions around the 
world, including the United States, Australia, Canada, Kenya and South Africa. The paper 
makes a cost-benefit analysis of these and other tax amnesties – and from this analysis 
develops a model tax amnesty, whose features maximise the benefits of a tax amnesty while 
minimising the potential costs. The model tax amnesty: (1) is permanent, (2) is available only 
to taxpayers who make a voluntary disclosure, (3) relieves taxpayers of penalties, interest 
and the risk of prosecution, but treats intentional and unintentional non-compliance 
differently, (4) has clear reporting requirements for taxpayers, and (5) is communicated 
clearly to attract non-compliant taxpayers without appearing unfair to the compliant ones.  
The paper then focuses on the Ugandan tax amnesty introduced in July 2019 – a Voluntary 
Disclosure Programme (VDP). As at 7 November 2020, this initiative had raised USh16.8 
billion (US$6.2 million) against a projection of USh45 billion (US$16.6 million). The paper 
examines the legal regime and administration of this VDP, scoring it against the model tax 
amnesty. It notes that, while the Ugandan VDP partially matches up to the model tax 
amnesty, because it is permanent, restricted to taxpayers who make voluntary disclosure 
and relieves penalties and interest only, it still falls short due to a number of limitations. 
These include: (1) communication of the administration of the VDP through a public notice, 
instead of a practice note that is binding on the tax authority; (2) uncertainty regarding 
situations where a VDP application is made while the tax authority has been doing a secret 
investigation into the taxpayer’s affairs; (3) the absence of differentiated treatment between 
taxpayers involved in intentional non-compliance, and those whose non-compliance may be 
unintentional; (4) lack of clarity on how the VDP protects the taxpayer when non-compliance 
involves the breach of other non-tax statutes, such as those governing financial regulation; 
(5) absence of clear timelines in the administration of the VDP, which creates uncertainty;
(6) failure to cater for voluntary disclosures with minor errors; (7) lack of clarity on VDP
applications that result in a refund position for the applicant; and (8) lack of clarity on how
often a VDP application can be made. The paper offers recommendations on how the
Ugandan VDP can be aligned to match the model tax amnesty, in order to gain the most
from this compliance tool.
Keywords: tax amnesty; voluntary disclosure programme; Uganda; Africa; tax 
administration; Uganda Revenue Authority. 
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Introduction 
 
Various forms of national and subnational tax amnesty initiatives have taken place around 
the world in recent years, in both developing and developed economies. There have been 
more than 60 amnesty programmes conducted in different states in the United States (US) 
since 1982 (Luitel 2014). In the developing world, South Africa introduced tax amnesties in 
2003 and 2006, and a Voluntary Disclosure Programme (VDP) in 2011 (Dare et al. 2018). 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) considers tax 
amnesty programmes to be: ‘an integral part of a broader compliance strategy – they need to 
be considered as part of a variety of compliance actions that tax administrations and 
governments take in order to encourage all taxpayers to meet their obligation’ (OECD 2015: 
7). 
 
A 2019 OECD report estimates that since 2009 VDPs in 40 jurisdictions resulted in the 
collection of an additional €102 billion in tax revenue, with over 1 million taxpayers disclosing 
their assets voluntarily (OECD 2019). Amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, tax amnesties have 
been one important way of providing relief to taxpayers around the world (Reyes-Tagle and 
Ospina 2020). 
 
In July 2019, Uganda introduced a tax amnesty programme in the form of a VDP. As at 7 
November 2020, this initiative had raised approximately USh16.8 billion (US$6.2 million) 
against a target of USh45 billion (US$16.6 million). This paper examines the legal regime 
and application of the Ugandan VDP. It begins with examining tax non-compliance, 
explaining why taxation is a suitable candidate for amnesty in Uganda. It looks at the use of 
tax amnesties in other jurisdictions, provides a cost-benefit analysis of these amnesties, and 
develops a model tax amnesty from this analysis. The paper then analyses how the current 
VDP in Uganda operates, and scores it against the model tax amnesty. The paper highlights 
the Ugandan VDP’s limitations, concluding with recommendations on how it can be 
improved.  
 
This paper relies on primary sources, including domestic and foreign tax statutes, case law 
from Uganda and other jurisdictions, public notices and circulars; and secondary literature, 
including academic articles and tax authority reports – which help understand the general 
rationale for tax amnesties, and the experience of other jurisdictions administering them. 
Analysis of domestic tax statutes was important to understand the legislative framework for 
VDP in Uganda. Analysis of foreign tax statutes was useful for comparative assessment of 
the Ugandan VDP. Case law from Uganda and selected jurisdictions, including Kenya, 
Canada, India, South Africa and the US, was analysed to understand judicial interpretations 
of different provisions relating to the VDP and tax amnesties. Canadian case law was 
particularly helpful, because documents accessed at the Uganda Revenue Authority showed 
that the administration of Uganda’s VDP was modelled on that of Canada.  
 
 
1  Taxpayer non-compliance 
 
Tax compliance remains a major challenge globally. A 2011 study in the US estimates that 
18 per cent to 23 per cent of total reportable income may not be reported to the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), giving rise to a tax gap1 in the range of US$390 to US$537 billion 
 
1  The tax gap is the difference between total taxes owed or those that would be collected under full compliance, and 
actual taxes collected. 
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(Feige and Cebula 2011). In 2019 the IRS released tax gap estimates for tax years 2011, 
2012 and 2013 that show that only 83.6 per cent of taxes were paid voluntarily and on time 
(IRS 2019). The EU tax gap resulting from largely domestic tax evasion is estimated to be 
€825 billion a year (Murphy 2019). The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA 2019) estimates the value added tax (VAT) tax gap in 24 African countries including 
Uganda, and finds that 12 countries have VAT gaps greater than 50 per cent. The Central 
African Republic has the highest VAT gap at 92.2 per cent, Uganda comes third at 71.4 per 
cent, while South Africa has the lowest VAT gap at 13.3 per cent (UNECA 2019). This is in 
line with a 2018 study that found that only 30 per cent of potential VAT revenue is collected 
in Uganda (Lakuma and Sserunjogi 2018). A 2019 study of income tax evasion in Uganda 
estimates the income tax gap to be 49 per cent (Lakuma 2019). 
 
There are many forms of tax non-compliance in Uganda, including:  
 
• Non-compliance by elite high net worth individuals (HNWIs), who invest in foreign tax 
havens and benefit from political capital and connections in evading taxes (Kangave et 
al. 2016). The 2017 Paradise Papers reveal how a prominent Ugandan politician had 
significant offshore investments in a tax haven (AlJazeera 2017). 
• Aggressive tax planning by multinational corporations, who take advantage of 
international tax norms and the difficulty of accessing financial information from other 
jurisdictions, to engage in illicit financial flows and pay the least amount of tax possible 
(Global Financial Integrity 2018). The 2016 Panama Papers leak reveal how a 
multinational oil corporation had avoided taxes in Uganda using double taxation 
agreements (BBC 2016). 
• Relatively large local corporations that take advantage of the tax administration body's 
limited audit capacity and access to information to under-declare their sales and income 
(Almunia et al. 2015). 
• Professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, architects, surveyors, with significant earnings, 
some of whom may be categorised as HNWIs (UBOS 2018; Kangave et al. 2016). A 
2019 study of income tax evasion in Uganda estimates that 62 per cent of professionals 
are involved in evasion and avoidance (Lakuma 2019). It has been reported that many 
professionals invest their untaxed earnings in land and commercial buildings (Kangave et 
al. 2016).  
 
Tax non-compliance also takes place when individuals in the informal sector underreport 
their income. The informal sector in Uganda is estimated to account for 52.4 per cent of GDP 
in Uganda, and yet contributes little in taxes (Akol 2015). In FY2019/2020 the informal sector 
contributed only USh5.2 billion in direct taxes, out of USh16.7 trillion collected (URA 2020a: 
9). Generally the informal sector is non-compliant because it remains hidden, untouched by 
existing business regulations (Mawejje 2013; Joshi et al. 2014). Most businesses in the 
informal sector do not register for taxes. The taxpayer register in Uganda had only 1.6 million 
voluntarily registered taxpayers, out of an estimated working population of 15.1 million in 
June 2020 (UBOS 2018b: 48; URA 2020a: 36).The informal sector includes smallholder 
farmers, who live just above subsistence level and sell surplus produce, and small retail 
businesses, including market stalls and kiosks, small restaurants, charcoal burners, transport 
service providers, and brewers of local drinks (UBOS 2018a: 134). Other economic activities, 
such as leasing of residential and commercial premises, are also run in a very informal 
manner (Gardner et al. 2020).  
 
Although the individual amount owed by each business in the informal sector may be small, 
due to the low income of most operators and correspondingly low tax rates, collectively the 
tax debt owed is potentially substantial. From the state’s perspective, the cost of auditing 
each business would be high relative to tax revenue, owing to the large number of individual 
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firms and difficulty of monitoring them (Joshi et al. 2014). The informal sector thus enjoys low 
risk of audit and penalisation, which, together with high cost of detection and enforcement 
relative to tax revenue, provide poor incentive for voluntary compliance (Joshi et al. 2014). 
 
Tax non-compliance also thrives due to low tax morale – the attitude towards paying taxes, 
including how compliant taxpayers view potential tax non-compliance of their fellow citizens 
(Barone and Mocetti 2009). Many Ugandans believe that taxes are too high, the tax system 
is unfair and public services are poor, resulting in low tax morale (Ali et al. 2014). Tax 
evasion is therefore partly accepted as a minor disobedience, rather than as undermining the 
functioning of the state in general. It is generally accepted as a kind of popular gaming 
activity, in which the state sometimes wins and sometimes loses (Ali et al. 2014). 
 
Amnesties are usually granted for offenses committed by a relatively large number of 
otherwise law-abiding ordinary citizens. A frequently flouted law ordinarily becomes 
illegitimate, and is soon modified. However, in certain cases changing the law is particularly 
undesirable, and some form of amnesty may provide a way to recapture legitimacy (Leonard 
and Zeckhauser 1987). Amnesties are more likely to be applied:  
 
• to offences that do not directly damage an identified party 
• to victimless offences against the state 
• where it is difficult to enforce the penalty, such as where the offence is committed by a 
large group of people and the cost of enforcement may outweigh any gains that could be 
derived from such actions (Leonard and Zeckhauser 1987). 
 
The discussion in this section shows that: 
 
• non-compliance with tax laws is a phenomenon present in all segments of society. High-
level criminal tax evasion does occur, but ordinary citizens who are usually law-abiding 
also participate in tax non-compliance 
• non-compliance is a result of a variety of factors, including a perception of tax rates being 
too high and the tax system being unfair 
• the tax authority has limited resources to conduct audits, investigations and 
enforcement.2 Tax non-compliance is therefore a suitable potential candidate for 
amnesty.  
 
 
2  Tax amnesties generally 
 
A tax amnesty is an opportunity given to taxpayers to write off an existing tax liability, 
including in certain cases interest and penalties, usually by paying a defined amount 
(Marchese 2019). A tax amnesty may be exceptional and available for only a limited period 
of time, or it may be inbuilt as a permanent feature of a tax regime where a taxpayer fulfills 
certain conditions. Tax amnesties may be general ‒ covering all taxes and all taxpayers ‒ or 
restricted to certain groups of taxpayers or taxes, and usually involve waiving criminal and 
civil penalties (Marchese 2019). Given the global nature of tax compliance challenges, tax 
amnesties in one form or another have been used by virtually all revenue authorities around 
the world. Some tax amnesties have been applied in a formal manner through amendment of 
the tax law, creating a temporary or permanent application process and documentation that 
is advertised by the tax authority. Others are not advertised – most revenue authorities waive 
or do not apply some penalties for taxpayers who ascribe their non-compliance to 
 
2  e.g. in FY2018/2019 only 142 (27%) of 527 scheduled audits for domestic taxes were completed (URA 2019). 
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administrative error, or who voluntarily declare and pay tax and interest on previously 
undeclared income (Leonard and Zeckhauser 1987). 
 
Under a tax amnesty, the tax authority may not collect payments through standard means, 
such as audits, injunctions or litigation in courts. Tax amnesties are therefore usually limited 
to taxpayers not yet under audit or investigation – where the collectible revenue has not yet 
been ascertained by the tax authority. However, tax amnesties sometimes include situtaions 
where the ordinary collection process has already commenced, and where the taxpayer has 
already been assessed. In these instances the ensuing opportunity cost may be considerably 
larger (Marchese 2019). Tax amnesties are usually supported by other interventions that 
range from reform of the tax system, to specific provisions aimed at strengthening tax 
enforcement powers. The underlying rationale is to accompany the carrot of amnesty with 
the stick of strict enforcement, in order to mitigate any negative effects on compliance. These 
interventions often include harsher penalties for non-compliance, increasing the capacity of 
tax auditors and investigators, modification of laws regulating tax shelters, and sometimes 
directing a portion of funds collected through the amnesty towards financing increased 
enforcement activities (Marchese 2019). 
 
2.1 Temporary tax amnesties 
 
Temporary amnesties are usually aimed at specific taxpayers for a defined period in order to 
deal with a specific issue. They are available to taxpayers who meet specific criteria and 
come forward within a specified timeframe to declare their non-compliance. The OECD notes 
that temporary amnesties are more targeted than permanent ones (OECD 2015). Temporary 
amnesties are usually justified by the claim that non-compliance with the tax law may be due 
to special circumstances, such as large scale tax reform, or major upheavals, such as 
political regime change or changes in currency. However, temporary tax amnesties tend to 
be used more frequently than exceptional circumstances alone would warrant. The first 
temporary amnesty is usually called a ‘final amnesty’, although others often eventually follow 
(Marchese 2019). 
 
2.2 Permanent tax amnesty (VDP)  
 
A permanent amnesty usually takes the form of a VDP run by the tax authority, where any 
taxpayer can at any time declare their non-compliance, and, subject to certain conditions, 
benefit from a waiver of interest or penalties, or both. Given the nature of the tax 
enforcement problem that necessitates amnesties in the first place, a quick change in 
taxpayer behaviour is likely to be difficult to achieve. Consequently, temporary amnesties are 
likely to experience credibility problems, and may result in inefficiency. The public’s beliefs 
will likely be slow to change, and little revenue may result from a temporary amnesty (Stella 
1991). This is especially so in developing countries, where the population has little trust in 
the tax authority (Ali et al. 2014). A long-term, or permanent, tax amnesty via a VDP may be 
preferable. 
 
A permanent tax amnesty helps the most unfortunate to improve their circumstances, while 
easing their return to legal compliant behaviour. Over time, economic shocks may affect 
certain firms or individuals disproportionately (e.g. sectorial crises and adverse life events). 
Non-compliance with tax laws may be used as a method of increasing disposable income in 
such circumstances. As there will always be some individuals experiencing these economic 
challenges, a standing permanent tax amnesty like a VDP is justified in terms of efficiency as 
a kind of social insurance, and maintaining equity by providing a lifeline for those most in 
need (Marchese 2019). 
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The OECD has developed a decision tree listing six factors that tax administrations ought to 
consider when designing and administering a VDP: 
 
1. Reason for the VDP, and whether it will be temporary or permanent. 
2. Scope of the VDP, including whether it will be available to all taxpayers or only those who 
meet specific criteria. 
3. Terms of the VDP, such as determining the incentive for a taxpayer to come forward. 
4. Reporting requirements for taxpayers. 
5. Opportunity for intelligence gathering through the VDP. 
6. Communication strategy – to attract target non-compliant taxpayers, and avoid creating 
perceptions of unfairness among compliant taxpayers (OECD 2015). 
 
2.3 Tax amnesties around the world 
 
One of the earliest known tax amnesties was inscribed on the Rosetta Stone in Egypt in 200 
BCE, during the reign of Ptolemy V. In For Good and Evil: The Impact of Taxes on the 
Course of Civilization, Charles Adams notes that: 
 
At the time the Rosetta Stone was inscribed, Egypt had been plagued by a civil war for 
over a decade. This war started after Egyptian soldiers returned home from a 
successful military campaign in the east; they found Egypt shackled with new tax 
burdens. In addition, the tax bureau had been strengthened with tough Greeks who 
were the best in the business. The revolt of these soldiers turned into a civil war, and to 
try to restore order the boy-king, Ptolemy V, issued a ‘Proclamation of Peace’. The 
most important provision was a general amnesty for the rebels. Tax debtors and rebels 
were freed from prison. Tax debts were forgiven. There would be no more forced 
conscriptions for the navy. Fugitives were invited to return and take back confiscated 
property. Finally, there would be tax immunity for the temples and their crops and 
vineyards, as in the days of the pharaohs (Adams 2001: 19). 
 
In recent years tax amnesties have been offered by many countries around the world. Luitel 
(2014) examines the temporary time-limited tax amnesties offered by several countries 
including Venezuela (1996), Panama (1974), Argentina (1987 and 1995), Belgium (1984), 
Columbia (1987), Costa Rica (1995 and 2003), France (1982 and 1986), India (1981 and 
1997), Ireland (1988 and 1993), Italy (1973, 1982, 1991 and 2003) and New Zealand (1988). 
A few countries have adopted permanent VDPs, and these are examined in detail below. 
 
2.3.1 United States 
 
In the US, the VDP has chiefly functioned to create immunity from prosecution. Between 
1919 and 1934, the tax authority would consider Offers in Compromise (OICs) in voluntary 
disclosure cases. An OIC is an agreement between a taxpayer and the tax authority, settling 
a taxpayer's tax liabilities for less than the full amount owed. However, as the policy was not 
publicly promoted, its exact application remains unclear (Madison 2001). Between 1934 and 
1952, the tax authority instituted a formal policy whereby it would not recommend criminal 
prosecution for taxpayers who revealed tax offences to a revenue official prior to the 
commencement of an investigation. This policy was only officially communicated in 1945 by 
the Secretary of the Treasury (Blackwell 1980). While the policy was in force, courts treated it 
as providing taxpayers with immunity from prosecution (Madison 2001). However, there were 
numerous difficulties in the administration of the VDP, due to lack of specific guidelines on 
what amounted to a voluntary disclosure – resulting in continuous litigation on the issue. The 
policy was abandoned in January 1952 (Blackwell 1980). The Tax Section of the American 
Bar Association attempted to have the policy reinstated with greater administrative flexibility, 
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but to no avail. In 1960 the Treasury Department communicated that it would not re-institute 
a VDP, even at an administrative level (Blackwell 1980). 
 
Between 1961 and 1990 an informal VDP was operational, whereby voluntary disclosure of a 
tax crime was considered in deciding whether or not to prosecute the offender. However, 
courts held that this informal practice provided defendants with no legally enforceable rights 
(Madison 2001). 
 
In 1990, the IRS adopted the Internal Revenue Manual section 342.142, which provided for a 
VDP whereby no prosecution would be recommended. To qualify for the VDP, the disclosure 
had to be: a) truthful, (b) timely, (c) complete, and (d) showing a willingness to cooperate with 
the IRS in determining the correct tax liability (Madison 2001). This is the position in the 
current IRS VDP. A disclosure is timely if it is done before the IRS has commenced a civil 
examination or criminal investigation, received information from a third party, or acquired 
information through a criminal enforcement action. The disclosure process has two parts: the 
taxpayer first submits a pre-clearance form to determine eligibility for the VDP; where 
eligibility is confirmed the disclosure form is submitted (IRS 2020).  
 
2.3.2 Australia  
 
The Australian VDP focuses largely on reduction of penalties applicable for non-compliance. 
It was introduced by the Taxation Laws Amendment (Self-Assessment) Act 1992 (Australia), 
which provided that where a taxpayer voluntarily discloses a tax shortfall prior to an audit the 
penalty is reduced to nil if the shortfall was less than A$1,000, and by 80 per cent if the 
shortfall was A$1,000 or more. In January 1994 the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) issued 
a tax ruling clarifying that: ‘certain disclosures may be treated as having been made 
voluntarily, notwithstanding that they are made after notification of an audit, where the 
disclosure is about a matter outside the scope of the audit or it could be concluded that the 
disclosure would have been made even if the audit had not been commenced’ (ATO 1994: 
3).  
 
The 1994 tax ruling also provides that where the disclosure is incomplete, but the degree of 
incompleteness is insignificant, the case may still be treated as a voluntary disclosure. 
However, it also noted that making a voluntary disclosure did not necessarily preclude a 
prosecution (ATO 1994).  
 
In 2000 the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Australia) was amended to introduce section 
284-225 of Schedule 1. This provided for a reduction in penalty on the same terms as the 
Taxation Laws Amendment (Self-Assessment) Act 1992, but also introduced a provision that 
where the taxpayer discloses non-compliance after an audit starts, the reduction is 20 per 
cent if the disclosure saves the ATO significant time or resources.  
 
A new tax ruling was issued in November 2008, which introduced a new definition of 
voluntary disclosure as an act of admission done without prompting, persuasion or 
compulsion on the part of the Commissioner (ATO 2008). It also clarified that for the 
purposes of section 284-225 a tax audit was not just a traditional audit, but included any 
examination of an entity’s financial affairs (ATO 2008). 
 
This 2008 tax ruling was withdrawn in September 2011 following the enactment of the Tax 
Laws Amendment (2010 Measures No. 1) Act 2010, which made significant amendments to 
section 284-225. These included replacing the statutorily defined term ‘tax audit’ with the 
wider phrase ‘examination ... of your affairs relating to a taxation law’, and a reduction of 
penalty to nil for disclosure of a false or misleading statement that does not result in a 
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shortfall. A new tax ruling was subsequently issued in 2012, defining voluntary disclosure as 
an act done without persuasion or compulsion on the part of the Commissioner (ATO 2012). 
The disclosure must be made prior to any direct contact with the entity or the entity’s 
representative by the Commissioner. The ruling notes that a disclosure made after the 
notification of an examination in relation to one taxation law only is regarded as having been 
made voluntarily if the disclosure relates to another taxation law. The ruling, however, 
cautions that it does not deal with whether or not an entity will be prosecuted where they 
have made a voluntary disclosure. Examination of an entity's affairs is defined as including 
reviews, audits, verification checks, record-keeping reviews/audits and other similar 
activities. It is not restricted to calculation of tax-related liabilities, but includes examinations 
in relation to debt collection, registration, reporting or other matters (ATO 2012). 
 
2.3.3 Canada  
 
Canada has had a VDP for many years. Information circulars published in 1970 and 1973 
indicate the existence of a VDP whereby taxpayers who made a voluntary disclosure would 
not be prosecuted or assessed for penalties (OAG 2004; Friedman 2016). The modern VDP 
emerged in June 2000, when the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) issued an information 
circular in respect of the VDP (Friedman 2016). The information circular was based on 
subsection 220(3.1) of the Income Tax Act (Cananda) and sections 88 and 281.1 of the 
Excise Tax Act (Cananda), which give the Minister of National Revenue the legislative 
authority to waive or cancel any interest or penalty (OAG 2004). The circular has been 
revised and updated a number of times, with minor variations with each revision (Friedman, 
2016). The most recent version was issued in 2017 as Information Circular, IC00-1R6 – 
Voluntary Disclosures Program (CRA 2017).  
 
Under Canada’s VDP, taxpayers who make a valid voluntary disclosure are not subject to 
prosecution and are generally relieved of the obligation to pay penalties. Interest relief, 
however, is only partial. The Minister may grant partial interest relief in respect of reporting 
periods preceding the three most recent years of returns required to be filed as a result of the 
disclosure (CRA 2017). With few exceptions, taxpayers are entitled to rely on the VDP once, 
and are thereafter expected to remain compliant. A subsequent application for relief under 
the VDP may only be considered if it is due to circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s control, 
and related to a different matter than the first application (CRA 2017). 
 
In addition to the information circular, CRA has a detailed VDP manual that guides staff in 
the administration of the programme. Although it has not been officially released, redacted 
copies of the VDP manual have been accessed by tax agents through access to information 
laws. The manual sets out in detail the criteria to be applied by CRA, the questions to be 
posed to taxpayers, the documentation and internal protocols to be followed, and the 
research and other steps to be followed. The CRA also periodically issues special 
announcements regarding circumstances under which the VDP will not be applied. For 
example, when the Panama Papers leaked in 2016, the CRA issued a communication that 
taxpayers named therein could not benefit from VDP (Friedman 2016). 
 
To qualify for VDP, the disclosure must be voluntary, complete, involve the application of a 
penalty, include information that is at least one year past due, and include payment of the 
estimated tax owing (CRA 2017). To be voluntary, the taxpayer must have lacked knowledge 
or awareness of any enforcement action. For purposes of the VDP, an enforcement action 
includes but is not limited to an audit, examination, investigation, requests, demands or 
requirements issued by the CRA, or direct contact by a CRA employee for any reason 
relating to non-compliance (CRA 2017). Computer-generated notices are prima facie an 
enforcement action; however where the CRA has not followed up on a computer-generated 
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notice that was issued far in the past, it may not be considered as such (Friedman 2016). To 
be complete the disclosure must be made for all relevant taxation years where there was 
previously inaccurate, incomplete or unreported information. Taxpayers are expected to 
submit all relevant information or documentation with their VDP application. In extraordinary 
circumstances, the taxpayer may request an additional period of time (generally not 
exceeding 90 days) to submit additional information to complete the application. Where 
books and records no longer exist, the taxpayer should make all reasonable efforts to 
estimate the income for those years (CRA 2017).  
 
Initially, the CRA required all taxpayers making disclosures to identify themselves clearly in 
their VDP applications. However, the no-name disclosure process was introduced in 2007, 
allowing anonymous disclosures (CRA 2007). The taxpayer’s advisor would communicate 
with the CRA, revealing the circumstances but not the name of the taxpayer. The identity 
would only be revealed if the CRA provided some indication that the taxpayer would qualify 
for the VDP (Friedman 2016). In most cases, the CRA stated that the taxpayer in question 
was not precluded from making a disclosure. 
 
Following a 2016 report by the Offshore Compliance Advisory Committee, a number of 
changes were introduced to the VDP (OCAC 2016). The no-name disclosure method was 
replaced by a pre-disclosure discussion service, whereby taxpayers or their authorised 
representatives may have a non-committal conversation with a CRA official on an 
anonymous basis. The VDP was split into two programmes: the limited programme and the 
general programme. The limited programme provides limited relief for VDP applications 
where the facts indicate an element of intentional non-compliance. Factors such as efforts 
made to avoid detection, the amounts involved (VDP applications by corporations with gross 
revenue in excess of Can$250 million are generally considered under the limited 
programme), the number of years of non-compliance and the sophistication of the taxpayer. 
Under the limited programme, the taxpayers escape prosecution and are not charged a 
gross negligence penalty. However, they are charged other penalties and interest as 
applicable. In other cases, the general programme would normally apply. Under the general 
programme taxpayers are not charged penalties, are not referred for criminal prosecution, 
and benefit from partial interest relief. 
 
2.4 Tax amnesties in Africa 
 
Several tax amnesties have been offered by African countries in recent years. In December 
2016 the Namibian Cabinet of Ministers initiated a tax amnesty programme lasting up to 31 
July 2017, writing off 70 per cent of interest and waiving all penalties (Namibia Economist 
2017; EY 2018).  
 
The Government of Ghana passed the Tax Amnesty Act 2017, (Act 955), which took effect in 
January 2018, granting amnesty to unregistered persons and registered persons who failed 
to file their tax returns or pay taxes. A person seeking to benefit from the amnesty was 
required to register with the GRA and file income tax returns for FY2014 to FY2016 by 30 
September 2018.3 
 
In Tanzania, the Tax Administration (Remission of Interest and Penalty) Order, 2018 was 
issued under the Tax Administration Act, 2015, giving power to the finance minister to issue 
regulations governing the Commissioner’s power to waive all or part of interest and penalties. 
The Order came into force on 1 July 2018 and expired on 31 December 2018. Eligible 
taxpayers enjoyed a 100 per cent waiver of interest and penalties, but had to pay the 
 
3  Section 1 of the Tax Amnesty Act 2017, (Act 955). 
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outstanding principal amount of tax not later than 30 June 2019. Unregistered persons, non-
filers, persons with pending tax disputes and ongoing audits were also allowed to apply.  
 
In Nigeria, the president issued Executive Order No. 004 in June 2017 to create a tax 
amnesty that ran from 1 July 2017 to 31 March 2018, offering taxpayers immunity from 
prosecution, waiver of interest and penalties, and an option to make instalment payments of 
the principal amount of the unpaid tax over three years.4 It extended to taxpayers undergoing 
tax audit or investigation, or who were in dispute with the tax authorities in tribunals or courts.  
 
At least two countries in Africa have developed a permanent or semi-permanent VDP. South 
Africa has a permanent VDP, while Kenya will start a three-year VDP on 1 January 2021. 
 
2.4.1 Kenya 
 
The Finance Act 2020, which came in force in June 2020, amends the 2015 Tax Procedures 
Act by introducing section 37D, which creates a three-year VDP that commences on 1 
January 2021.5 Relief from prosecution, penalties and interest is granted to a person who 
discloses their tax liabilities to the Commissioner.6 The tax liabilities must have accrued 
within a period of five years prior to 1 July 2020.7 The penalty waiver and interest will be 
granted to taxpayers at a rate of 100 per cent for disclosures made within the first year, 50 
per cent for disclosures in the second year and 25 per cent for disclosures in the third year of 
the programme.8 The Act provides that the disclosure ‘shall be voluntary and disclose all 
material facts’.9 The VDP therefore does not apply where the taxpayer is ‘under audit, 
investigation or is a party to ongoing litigation in respect of the tax liability or any matter 
relating to the tax liability; or has been notified of a pending audit or investigation by the 
Commissioner’.10 Where the Commissioner discovers that a taxpayer benefiting from VDP 
failed to disclose a material fact in respect of the relief, the Commissioner may withdraw any 
relief granted, or assess and collect any balance of the tax liability, or commence 
prosecution.11 
 
2.4.2 South Africa 
 
South Africa has instituted a number of tax amnesties over the years. In 1995, the 
government allowed unregistered persons a window from 10 July to 31 January 1996 in 
which they could be fully registered as taxpayers without payment of any penalty (Dare et al. 
2018). A second amnesty was introduced in 1996 through the Final Relief on Tax, Interest, 
Penalty and Additional Tax Act.12 This applied to unregistered persons and registered non-
filers, as well as taxpayers who filed with errors in their tax returns.13 The Act provided relief 
from the requirement to pay the principal amount of tax for any year of assessment that 
ended on or before 28 February 1994, as well as relief from penalty, interest and 
prosecution.14 The taxpayer benefiting from the VDP only had to pay the principal tax due in 
 
4  Executive Order No. 004 of 2017 available at https://nipc.gov.ng/ViewerJS/?#../wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/EXECUTIVE-ORDER-4_2.pdf. 
5  Section 37D(1) and (4) of the Tax Procedures Act, 2015 [Hereinafter TPA]. 
6  Section 37D(2) of the TPA. 
7  Section 37D(3) of the TPA. 
8  Section 37D(4) of the TPA. 
9  Section 37D(5) of the TPA.  
10  Section 37D(12) of the TPA. 
11  Section 37D(10) of the TPA.  
12  Final Relief on Tax, Interest, Penalty and Additional Tax Act No 101 of 1996 [Hereinafter Final Relief Act]. 
13  Section 1(1)(iv) of the Final Relief Act. 
14  Section 5 of the Final Relief Act. 
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respect of the last two years of assessment that ended before 1 March 1996. The Act 
provided for a relief period lasting from 1 November 1996 to 28 February 1997.15  
 
In 2003, the South African government introduced the Exchange Control Amnesty and 
Amendment of Taxation Laws Act of 2003.16 This law provided amnesty from 1 June to 30 
November 2003 for taxpayers with undisclosed offshore income to correct their affairs. The 
law provided that a taxpayer benefiting from the amnesty would not be liable for tax in 
respect of any undeclared income from a source outside South Africa during any year of 
assessment ending on or before 28 February 2003, and would be deemed not to have 
committed any offence.17 The taxpayer, however, had to pay a domestic tax amnesty levy of 
2 per cent of the declared amount.  
 
In 2006, the South African government introduced the Small Business Tax Amnesty and 
Amendment of Taxation Laws Act, which provided an amnesty from 1 August 2006 to 31 
May 2007 to small businesses – businesses whose gross receipts did not exceed R10 million 
(USD 600,000) – which voluntarily declared their unreported income and complied with the 
tax legislation.18 The law also provided for a progressive tax amnesty levy from 0 per cent to 
5 per cent of the taxable income.19 The Small Business Tax Amnesty was introduced to deal 
with the taxi industry, which, due to its informal nature, remained outside the tax base despite 
being valued as a multi-billion rand industry (Junpath et al. 2016). 
 
In 2012, the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 was passed. Sections 225-233 of this law 
provide for the current permanent South African VDP. The VDP applies to all taxes 
administered by South African Revenue Service (SARS), with the exception of customs and 
excise. Any person can voluntarily disclose their non-compliance unless they are aware of a 
pending audit or investigation, or an audit or investigation has already commenced.20 
However, even with an ongoing audit or investigation, a senior SARS official may direct that 
the taxpayer apply for the VDP where the default disclosed would not otherwise have been 
detected during the audit or investigation, and the application would be in the interest of good 
management of the tax system and best use of SARS’ resources.21 
 
Similar to the Canadian VDP, to qualify for the South African VDP the disclosure must be 
voluntary, full and complete in all material respects, involve a previously undisclosed default, 
not result in a refund due by SARS and be made in the prescribed form and manner.22 The 
VDP allows no-name voluntary disclosure, whereby a tax representative may provide 
sufficient information without including the identity of the taxpayer, and a senior SARS official 
may issue a non-binding private opinion in respect of a person’s eligibility for relief.23 
Taxpayers who voluntarily disclose their non-compliance have their understatement penalties 
reduced and their administrative non-compliance penalties completely waived.24 The 
magnitude of the relief is dependent on whether the disclosure is undertaken prior to or after 
 
15  Section 1(1)(vi) of the Final Relief Act. 
16  Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act No. 12 of 2003 (hereinafter Exchange Amnesty Act). 
17  Section 15 of the Exchange Amnesty Act. 
18  Sections 2(b) and 3 of the Small Business Tax Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act No. 9 of 2006 
(hereinafter Small Business Amnesty Act). 
19  Section 6(3) of the Small Business Amnesty Act. 
20  Section 226(1) of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (hereinafter TAA). 
21  Section 226(2) of the TAA. 
22  Section 227 of the TAA. 
23  Section 228 of the TAA. 
24  Section 229 of the TAA. 
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the issuance of an audit notice by the tax authority.25 The taxpayer also gets effective 
immunity from prosecution in respect of any tax offence arising from the default disclosed.26 
 
Where a VDP application is accepted, a senior SARS official and the taxpayer sign a written 
agreement .27 The Commissioner is required to provide an annual summary of all voluntary 
disclosure agreements to the Auditor-General and Minister of Finance. The summary must 
contain details of the number of voluntary disclosure agreements and the amount of tax 
assessed, but must not disclose the identity of the taxpayer.28 
 
2.5 A cost-benefit analysis of tax amnesties 
 
2.5.1 Benefits from tax amnesties 
 
Tax amnesties provide several benefits to the tax authority, taxpayer, government and 
society as a whole. 
 
Boost in revenue collection. A critical benefit of a tax amnesty/VDP is that it may lead to a 
boost in revenue collection. A tax amnesty offers non-compliant taxpayers a chance to wipe 
the slate clean by paying some or all of what they owe. Research has shown that individuals 
consider fiscal incentives in deciding whether and to what extent they will participate in an 
amnesty (Alm and Beck 1991). Allowing known non-compliant taxpayers to participate, such 
as those already under audit or investigation, may have a positive impact on amnesty 
revenue. For these taxpayers, the amnesty can be considered a relatively inexpensive 
means by which a significant portion of their known tax liabilities can be collected (Alm and 
Beck 1991).  
 
Access to data and intelligence on tax evasion. Tax amnesties may help the tax authority 
to collect data on tax evasion and other forms of non-compliance. This data can 
subsequently be used when profiling taxpayers for risk. Basic data that reveals some 
common characteristics among taxpayers who engage in evasion can be invaluable. While 
amnesty participants may not necessarily be representative of all evaders, the near total 
absence of data on non-filers in most tax authorities makes comparison of the characteristics 
of amnesty participants relative to the taxpaying population useful for tax authorities looking 
to improve the allocation of their enforcement resources (Fisher et al. 1989). 
 
The tax amnesty can also be used to collect intelligence relating to tax evasion. Given the 
criminal nature of evasion, collecting information on this is usually very difficult. Some tax 
authorities require disclosure of certain information, such as documents and information on 
foreign accounts, assets, institutions and facilitators, for a VDP application to be considered 
complete. For example, the Italian VDP requires applicants to disclose all participants and 
facilitators engaged in any tax fraud (Grilli 2015). This is information that can assist the tax 
authority in identifying tax evasion schemes and those who facilitate them, the 
methodologies used by tax evaders, and to determine what information and records are likely 
to be available to an investigator. The tax authority may be able to use this information to 
identify other non-compliant taxpayers who have not taken part in the VDP. However, 
considerable tact is needed when determining the scope of intelligence gathering to avoid 
deterring taxpayers from coming forward in the first place (OECD 2015).  
 
 
25  Section 223 of the TAA. 
26  Section 229 of the TAA. 
27  Section 230 of the TAA. 
28  Section 233 of the TAA. 
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Encourage renewed tax compliance. Studies have found that tax amnesties tend to have a 
positive effect on tax compliance, and many previously non-compliant taxpayers continue to 
be compliant long after the amnesty has ended (Yucedogru and Sarisoy 2020). In order to 
continue to hide their past non-compliance, non-compliant taxpayers are often forced to 
continue to file inaccurate tax returns. A tax amnesty ‘makes future adherence to the tax 
code more likely by removing the need to conceal past sins’ (Leonard and Zeckhauser 1987: 
61). An analysis of the long-term compliance impact of a three-month tax amnesty in Malawi 
that ran from 1 November 2013 to 31 January 2014 found that 75 per cent of those who 
disclosed their non-compliance subsequently remained compliant (Masiya 2019). A study of 
a tax amnesty in the state of Michigan found that two-thirds of new filers that came forward 
under the amnesty remained compliant, while 90 per cent of the pre-existing filers who 
participated in the amnesty remained compliant (Christian and Gupta 2002). 
 
Allow the taxpayer to get rid of guilt. Guilt is a powerful moral emotion that is known to 
influence ethical decision-making. Tax amnesties encourage non-compliant taxpayers to self-
correct. A study relying on 239 responses by Canadian taxpayers found that appealing to 
taxpayers’ guilt, through efforts to increase the foreseeability of possible negative 
consequences of tax evasion, may be a promising strategy in encouraging non-compliers to 
self-correct (Farrar and Hausserman 2016). The study found that the likelihood of a taxpayer 
making a disclosure is greatest when the individual assumes personal responsibility for the 
non-compliance, and can foresee the negative consequences. The study concludes that an 
emotional appeal for taxpayers to be compliant and pay taxes that should have been 
remitted may increase tax revenue (Farrar and Hausserman 2016).  
 
Support transition to new enforcement regimes. Where a new enforcement regime is 
being introduced, tax amnesties can be used to support this enforcement. Tax amnesties can 
improve the tax authority’s operating capacity – they result in the elimination of problematic 
taxpayer files that need attention, allowing them to reallocate their resources elsewhere 
(Yucedogru and Sarisoy 2020). Further, where tax laws have not been strictly enforced for a 
long period of time, and a significant portion of the population has been able to get away with 
non-compliance, it creates an implicit assumption that non-compliance is not a serious 
offence (Leonard and Zeckhauser 1987). Where the tax authority is introducing a regime of 
enhanced collection and detection procedures, harsher penalties, and so on, an amnesty 
period can be used to ease transition to the new regime. The intervening amnesty period 
may make the change in regime appear fair. The guilt felt by many would-be-compliant 
taxpayers can be relieved without imposing severe penalties; harsher penalties can 
subsequently be used to deal with those tax evaders who choose not to participate (Fisher et 
al. 1989). 
 
2.5.2 Cost of tax amnesties 
 
Tax amnesties may be perceived as unfair to compliant taxpayers. Compliant taxpayers 
may feel unjustly treated, either because non-compliant taxpayers are not punished, or 
because they feel foolish for having been compliant (Leonard and Zeckhauser 1987). This is 
usually the case where the majority have been compliant, and only a minority have been 
non-compliant. The compliant taxpayers’ attitude towards an amnesty has to be taken into 
account when determining how it will be applied. Compliant taxpayers may feel that an 
amnesty is a violation of equity, because it results in discriminatory treatment of citizens – 
amnesty participants pay a different amount to compliant taxpayers, and those who were 
caught before the amnesty. A study of voter reaction to granting of tax amnesties where the 
majority of the population is compliant showed that governments that granted amnesties 
shortly before an election were often voted out of power (Torgler and Schaltegger 2005). 
Tax-compliant taxpayers/voters consider a tax amnesty to be unfair to them, and electorally 
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punish governments that offer them. One study of US Governors who lost re-election bids 
found that they were more than twice as likely to have offered a tax amnesty during their 
election years (Borgne 2006). A study of taxpayer reaction to the 2016 Turkish tax amnesty 
found that taxpayer perception of fairness was negatively affected by tax amnesties 
(Yucedogru and Sarisoy 2020). 
 
In practice, however, tax amnesties may not necessarily be inequitable. Even without 
amnesties, compliant taxpayers already pay significantly more tax than tax evaders. The tax 
amnesty collects a little more revenue from tax evaders, thereby reducing the difference 
between what is paid by the two groups – thereby supporting horizontal equity. Even vertical 
equity increases where HNWIs who evade more take advantage of tax amnesties (Borgne 
2006).  
 
Compliant risk becoming non-compliant. Depending on the perceived likelihood of its 
repetition, a tax amnesty might lead non-compliant taxpayers who hope to benefit from a 
subsequent amnesty to remain non-compliant, or even incentivise evasion among hitherto 
compliant taxpayers who anticipate a future tax amnesty (Leonard and Zeckhauser 1987). A 
study of amnesties issued by states in the US found that the first time a state offers an 
amnesty results in a short-term revenue boost during the amnesty period, but leads to a 
reduction in revenue in the long term (Luitel 2014). A study of the 2014 and 2018 tax 
amnesties in Zimbabwe found that ‘a negative association exists between tax amnesties and 
tax compliance’, noting that there was a decline in compliance following each amnesty 
(Wadesango et al. 2020). This is explained by people responding to the amnesty by 
beginning to evade taxes, in anticipation of future amnesties. Another explanation is that tax 
amnesties negatively affect taxpayers’ perception of the possibility of being caught by tax 
authorities. The efficiency of tax inspection deteriorates in an environment where there are 
frequent tax amnesties. Tax amnesties reduce the fear of being caught by the tax authorities 
(Yucedogru and Sarisoy 2020). Repeated amnesties also encourage taxpayers to engage in 
temporary non-compliance, treating the state as a short-term loan provider. Hypothetically, a 
firm in need of a short-term loan may not remit its monthly tax payments in anticipation of an 
amnesty, and use that money in lieu of a loan – then pay the tax during the amnesty period 
(Ross and Buckwalter 2013). 
 
Revenue gains are minimal and often overstated. Despite their apparent popularity, 
revenue gains from tax amnesties generally appear to be minimal and are often below their 
target. A 2008 International Monetary Fund study of tax amnesties in the US, Ireland, Italy, 
Argentina, Turkey and The Phillipines noted that ‘amnesties yield additional revenue, 
although often not as much as expected’ (Baer and Borgne 2008: vii). The 2016 Namibian 
tax amnesty only raised N$1.4 billion (US$84 million) against a target of N$4 billion (US$240 
million), despite three extensions of the amnesty up to March 2018 (Chiringa 2018). The 
2018 Ghanaian tax amnesty raised only GH₵287 million (US$49 million) against a target of 
GH₵500 million (US$88 million) (Larnyoh 2019).  
 
It has also been argued that the true revenue yield from tax amnesties is overstated, 
because it is not always clear that revenue yield is due to an amnesty. Other factors, such as 
GDP growth and enhanced tax enforcement that usually accompany tax amnesties, may 
also contribute to revenue growth. A study of taxpayer data in Kenya following the 2004 tax 
amnesty finds that it did not have a positive effect on tax revenue growth after controlling for 
other revenue factors like GDP and inflation (Kilonzo 2012). 
 
Tax amnesties accelerate receipt of funds that would have been collected even without the 
amnesty, while forfeiting collectable penalties. This is especially the case where the amnesty 
extends to those already under investigation for tax evasion. A study of the Michigan tax 
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amnesty found that the long-term addition to revenue coming from new taxpayers was small, 
and easily offset by negative effects of the amnesty on tax compliance (Fisher et al. 1989). A 
study of the tax amnesty programme in Argentina found that the increase in short-term 
revenue was temporary, and resulted in accelerated collection of taxes, but did not increase 
the amount collected (Villalba 2017). 
 
Tax amnesties may have a negative impact on long-term tax compliance, offsetting the 
temporary increase in revenue during the amnesty period. Tax amnesties may thus be a 
‘penny-wise and pound-foolish’ policy that potentially impede long-term revenue goals (Luitel 
2014). A study of tax amnesties in the US between 1981 and 2011 found that the benefits 
are only modest and in many cases do not exceed the costs of such programmes (Bayer et 
al. 2015). A study of the 2014 and 2018 tax amnesties in Zimbabwe finds that compliance 
levels declined gradually after the amnesties (Wadesango et al. 2020). 
 
Tax amnesties may distort revenue projection figures and future performance measurement. 
Revenue forecasting is critical in ensuring stability in government tax and expenditure 
policies. Forecasts are based on certain underlying methodologies and common 
assumptions. These rely on currently available information and what is assumed at the time 
in the estimation process (Jenkins et al. 2000). Tax amnesties may distort forecasting, 
because in the year the amnesty is applied revenue collection may increase significantly. 
Where revenue forecasting is based on previous collection, the projected figure for the 
subsequent year in which there is no amnesty may be higher than it would otherwise have 
been (Leal et al. 2007). As a result of these distortions, the tax authority may fail to meet the 
higher projection. 
 
Undermine social sanction against tax non-compliance. Tax amnesties may undermine 
the strength of social sanction against the amnestied behaviour, thereby reducing the guilt 
felt by non-compliant taxpayers. While eradication of guilt may be a benefit to taxpayers, it is 
a cost to the tax authority and to society. Many taxpayers may be compliant simply because 
they believe it is the right thing to do, and would feel guilty if they did not comply (Leonard 
and Zeckhauser 1987). Amnesties for tax evasion may make non-compliance seem less 
significant, thereby reducing the guilt of tax evaders. Guilt and shame are highly efficient 
tools for social control, and societies struggle to instil the values that create a conscience, 
and feeling guilt and shame for certain acts. Where guilt and shame are eroded, society must 
rely on considerably more expensive and less efficient methods to identify and punish those 
who do not obey the law (Leonard and Zeckhauser 1987).  
 
Tax amnesties remain the second best tool. Tax amnesties are primarily used to 
overcome structural rigidity in countries in which the enforcement systems suffer from major 
structural problems. This allows the state to capitalise on its own inefficiency, as it is able to 
delay needed reforms. Tax amnesties therefore remain the second-best tool, and should only 
be used when reform of the tax system cannot easily be undertaken (Villalba 2017). An 
analysis of Nigeria’s 2017 amnesty recommended that the government focus on building and 
strengthening institutions that support accountability and perception of good governance in 
order to encourage long-term voluntary tax compliance (Okoye 2019). A study of the 2012 
offshore VDP in the US noted that such measures are inadequate to deal with recalcitrant 
evaders who will gamble on continuing to be undetected. The proper solution is long-term 
enforcement initiatives, such as focusing on exchange of information with other jurisdictions 
(Lederman 2012). Bilateral exchange of information agreements, and multilateral 
agreements such as the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters, which has been signed by 61 jurisdictions, are better solutions to non-compliance 
than tax amnesties (OECD 2011). These agreements create a sense of urgency among non-
compliant taxpayers – that their offshore assets can be traced more easily. 
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3  A model tax amnesty 
From the above analysis of literature relating to tax amnesties, the following are 
characteristics of an ideal tax amnesty: 
(i) The amnesty ought to be a permament VDP rather than a temporary one. A permanent
VDP is more credible and has less impact on the efficiency of tax administration. A
permanent VDP maintains equity by providing a lifeline for those most in need. The VDP
ought to be accompanied by enhanced compliance and enforcement measures.
(ii) The VDP should apply only to taxpayers who voluntarily disclose their previous non-
compliance – who are not under audit or investigation. The VDP may only be extended to
such taxpayers where it can be shown that the audit or investigation would not have
discovered the non-compliance. A taxpayer should only be able to make a single
voluntary disclosure. Allowing for repeated voluntary disclosures risks incentivising non-
compliance. Anonymous disclosures ought not to be accepted.
(iii) The VDP should offer a waiver of penalties and interest, but not the principal amount
owed as tax. The VDP should offer immunity from prosecution for the tax offence. A
distinction should be made between taxpayers who engaged in active tax evasion, such
as fraudulent acts and forging documents, and those who engaged in minor non-
compliance, such as resulting from ignorance. Only prosecution and penalties should be
waived for the former, while both penalties and interest could be waived for the latter.
(iv) The VDP should have clear reporting requirements, including details such as the exact
nature of non-compliance and reason for non-compliance. Contracts, books of accounts
and financial statements may be required to be submitted with the application.
Information relating to tax agents who facilitated intentional non-compliance may also be
required. The application procedures ought to be simplified as much as possible, and an
online application procedure would be preferable.
(v) The VDP should be communicated very clearly, highlighting the benefits of the
programme, to target and attract non-compliant taxpayers. What amounts to voluntary
disclosure should be clearly communicated to taxpayers. At the same time, the
communication should ensure that compliant taxpayers perceive the VDP as fair.
4  Tax amnesties in Uganda 
Tax amnesties have been a feature of the Ugandan tax system since the 1990s. In 1999, the 
Finance Act created an amnesty for all arrears of the coffee stabilisation tax, sales tax and 
commercial transactions levy.29 In 2006, all arrears of import duties, excise duties, VAT and 
withholding taxes owed by the government were written off.30  
In 2007, the Finance Act remitted all arrears of licence fees on motor vehicles, trailers and 
engineering plants and arrears of VAT owed by local governments as at 30 June 2006.31 
This law also created a temporary amnesty based on a VDP. A taxpayer who voluntarily 
disclosed their non-compliance and paid the principal amount of tax on or before 31 
December 2007 had the interest and penalties otherwise applicable waived.32 The law took 
effect from 1 July 2007. The URA issued a practice note which detailed the manner in which 
29 Section 14 of the Finance Act No 2 of 1999. 
30 Section 2 of the Finance Act, 2006. 
31 Section 6 of the Finance Act, 2007. 
32 Section 5 and 6 of the Finance Act, 2007. 
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the amnesty was being operationalised (URA 2007). The practice note described a voluntary 
disclosure as: ‘a taxpayer coming out at his own initiative and reporting what is wrong with 
his declarations before the URA finds out through some other means such as audits or from 
third party sources’. 
Nonetheless the practice note also permitted taxpayers with pending audits to benefit from 
the amnesty. The initiative received great public approval, but collected only USh41 billion 
against the target of USh223 billion (ADBG 2010; Musitwa 2007). 
Subsequently, more tax amnesties have been offered without the requirement of voluntary 
disclosure. In 2008 the Finance Act waived all arrears of VAT, income tax, excise duty, 
import duty, penalties and interest due on or before 30 June 2002 and still outstanding by 30 
June 2008.33 In 2016 the Finance Act waived all tax arrears owed by Savings and Credit 
Cooperative Societies as at 31 December 2015.34 In 2019 all unpaid taxes owed by 
government as at 30 June 2019 were written off.35 A form of amnesty also exists in the Tax 
Procedures Code Act (TPCA), which provides that an additional assessment can only be 
made within three years of the self-assessment return to which it relates, unless the taxpayer 
or their agent has commited fraud or gross neglect.36 
4.1 The current VDP in Uganda 
In July 2019, section 66(1a) of the TPCA was introduced. This section provides that where a 
person who has committed an offence under a tax law voluntarily discloses the commission 
of that offence to the Commissioner at any time prior to commencement of court 
proceedings, the Commissioner may enter into an agreement with the offender to compound 
the offence if the offender agrees to pay to the Commissioner the outstanding unpaid tax, 
and that person shall not be required to pay any interest or fine due.  
Under section 66 of the TPCA, the Commissioner can only compound an offence if the 
offender admits the offence in writing and requests to enter into a compounding agreement.37 
The compounding agreement is required to specify the name of the offender, offence 
committed, the written admission, sum of money to be paid, and date for payment.38 The 
agreement is not subject to any appeal and may be enforced in the same manner as a 
decree of any court for payment of the amount stated, and serves as proof of the conviction 
of the offender for the offence specified.39 
4.1.1 Discretion under section 66(1a) of the TPCA 
The power to compound a tax offence under section 66(1a) of the TPCA is a discretionary 
power due to three reasons:  
i. The use of the word ‘may’, which implies discretion.
ii. This is a compounding provision, which generally involves discretion.
iii. VDP provisions in other jurisdictions are usually discretionary.
33 Section 4 of the Finance Act, 2008. 
34 Section 7 of the Finance Act, 2016. 
35 Section 40A of the TPCA, 2014 as amended. 
36 Section 23(2) of the TPCA. 
37 Section 66(2) of the TPCA. 
38 Section 66(3) of the TPCA. 
39 Section 66(3) of the TPCA. 
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The use of ‘may’ 
Section 66(1a) provides that the Commissioner ‘may’ enter into a compounding agreement. 
This implies that the provision is discretionary. In his book, Understanding Statutes, 
Professor Crabbe notes that: ‘The word may is an auxiliary verb which is normally used in a 
legislative sentence to confer a power, a privilege or a right. Its use implies the permissive, 
the optional or a discretionary power or conduct. As a general rule, may is not a word of 
command… May, therefore, in its ordinary meaning, gives an enabling, a discretionary 
power’ (Crabbe 1994: 32). 
While ‘may’ is occasionally interpreted as a command, this is only done where the context or 
subject matter of the provision indicate that it is intended as such.40 This is done such that 
‘justice may not be the slave of grammar’ (Crabbe 1994: 32). As Ruth Sullivan explains in her 
book, Statutory Interpretation: ‘“May” is always permissive, in the sense that it always confers 
a power. The power is presumed to be discretionary unless something in the context obliges 
its recipient to exercise it’ (Sullivan 2007: 74). However, there is nothing in section 66(1a) to 
suggest that ‘may’ should be interpreted as mandatory – therefore it is discretionary. 
Discretion under compounding provisions 
Compounding provisions involve an agreement between a public authority responsible for 
enforcing a particular provision and an offender who has breached that provision. The 
compounding agreement is in the nature of a contract, and the public authority will have high 
discretion in deciding whether or not to enter it.41 In the Indian case of Vikram v Union of 
India42 involving compounding of a tax offence, the court observed that: ‘Compounding of 
offences cannot be taken as a matter of right. It is for the law and authorities to determine as 
to what kind of offences should be compounded, if at all, and under what conditions’.43  
In Kasibo v URA,44 the court likened compounding to plea bargaining, stating: ‘Compounding 
an offence in my understanding is a form of settlement of the offence without prosecution 
that results into a settlement order. It is a form of plea bargain with the offender that results in 
an admission of the offence in the expectation, no doubt, of a lighter sentence. This is 
because no prosecution has taken place saving all concerned valuable time and 
resources’.45 The court therefore considered that if the Commissioner considers a taxpayer 
to be a ‘hard-core’ offender, the Commissioner may opt not to compound the offence, and 
instead prosecute the offender to the fullest extent of the law.  
The discretionary power to compound offences is prone to abuse. In describing a 
compounding provision, the court in URA v Remigious46 questioned whether such a 
provision could even pass constitutional muster given the incredible powers it placed in the 
hands of the Commissioner General. The court stated: ‘The Commissioner-General is given 
awesome power in which he is in effect the investigator, prosecutor and the judge. The 
Commissioner-General is a judge in his own cause. No appeals are allowed against this 
decision of the Commissioner-General’.47 
40 See e.g. Begumisa v Tibebaga [2004] 2 EA 17. Similarly, the word ‘shall’ has on occasion been interpreted as directory 
rather than mandatory: see e.g. Sebalu v Njuba Election Appeal No 26 of 2007. 
41 Kasibo v URA [2008] UGCOMMC 37. 
42 Vikram v Union of India High Court of Delhi WP(C) 6268/2017. 
43 Vikram v Union of India High Court of Delhi WP(C) 6268/2017 at Para 25. 
44 Kasibo v URA [2008] UGCOMMC 37. 
45 Kasibo v URA [2008] UGCOMMC 37 at Para 18. 
46 URA v Remigious [2005] UGCOMMC 45. 
47 URA v Remigious [2005] UGCOMMC 45 at Para 10. 
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In recognition of its potential for abuse, the discretionary power to compound an offence 
cannot be delegated by the Commissioner General.48 Further, discretionary power to 
compound offences is usually tamed by guidelines. In Vikram v Union of India49 the court 
observed that: ‘The power to compound cannot be completely unbridled inasmuch as the 
same could give rise to enormous discretionary power, which could also lead to arbitrariness, 
discrimination, abuse etc. For this reason, and in order to maintain uniformity and 
consistency, circulars and guidelines are required to be issued for compounding of offences. 
Such guidelines and circulars ensure a degree of objectivity’.50 The Commissioner General’s 
power to compound under section 66(1a) has therefore been delineated in public notices 
issued by URA. 
Discretionary VDPs in other jurisdictions 
VDPs have been considered to be discretionary in Canada. In the Canadian case of 
Worsfold v The Minister of National Revenue,51 the court emphasised that granting of relief 
under the VDP was discretionary and not available as of right. The reason for this is that the 
taxpayer has failed to fulfil their statutory duty to be tax-compliant, and this failure does not 
confer a right to be excused from consequent penalties. The VDP is an exceptional relief that 
is accessible at the discretion of the authority, not as a right by the taxpayer. This was 
articulated in the Canadian case of Williams v The Minister of National Revenue, where the 
court noted that: ‘The applicant was under an obligation to comply with the requirements of 
the Act, and became liable for penalties when he failed to do so. The discretion accorded to 
the Minister to waive or cancel any penalties imposed is broad, and constitutes exceptional 
relief from penalties for which taxpayers are otherwise liable to pay under statute’.52 
Penalties, interest and risk of prosecution exist in tax statutes as a means of deterrence from 
non-compliance. Creating an automatic suspension of these deterrent provisions through a 
VDP application undermines tax administration – which needs a stick as much as a carrot, if 
not more so. The value of these deterrent tax provisions was acknowledged in the Canadian 
case of CRA v Telfer,53 in which Ms Telfer’s objection to assessments was held in abeyance 
pending determination of a court case with similar issues. Upon conclusion of the case the 
objection was dismissed and accumulated interest was charged. Ms Telfer sought relief from 
the interest arguing that the delay was partly due to the pending case. The court rejected this 
argument, noting that: ‘Those who, like Ms Telfer, knowingly fail to pay a tax debt pending a 
decision in a related case normally cannot complain that they should not have to pay interest. 
If they had promptly paid the sum claimed to be due, and were later found not liable to pay it, 
the Minister would have had to repay the overpayment, with interest. The relatively high rate 
of interest charged to the taxpayer is no doubt intended, for the benefit of all taxpayers, to 
encourage the prompt payment of tax debts’.54  
The purpose of the VDP is to support statutory requirement of compliance, not to confer 
rights upon non-compliant taxpayers. This was well articulated by the court in Williams v The 
Minister of National Revenue,55 where the judge stated:  
48 Section 46 of the TPCA. 
49 Vikram v Union of India High Court of Delhi WP(C) 6268/2017. 
50 Vikram v Union of India High Court of Delhi WP(C) 6268/2017 at Para 25. 
51 Worsfold v The Minister of National Revenue (2012) FC 644. 
52 Williams v The Minister of National Revenue (2011) FC 766 at Para 26. 
53 CRA v. Telfer, 2009 FCA 23. 
54 CRA v. Telfer, 2009 FCA 23 Para 35. 
55 Williams v The Minister of National Revenue (2011) FC 766 at Para 31. 
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I would add that the degree of procedural fairness and the robustness by which the 
principle is implemented varies with the nature of the interests or rights engaged and 
with the nature of the discretion. The VDP is a highly discretionary programme which, 
as its object, encourages compliance with important mandatory statutory requirements. 
Put more bluntly, it is designed to encourage taxpayers to do that which they were 
required by law to have done in the first place. As such, the criteria governing the 
exercise of discretion are strict and narrow and the rights involved are minimal.56 
Interpreting section 66(1a) of the TPCA in any other way risks creating an absurdity – a non-
compliant taxpayer being placed in a better position than a compliant one, incentivising 
compliant taxpayers to become non-compliant and benefit from the VDP. If section 66(1a) is 
not discretionary, then a rational taxpayer would have more incentive to be non-compliant 
than to be compliant because they can claim an automatic right to benefit from the VDP and 
thereby avoid any penalties or interest. Automatic waiver of penalties and interest for every 
non-compliant taxpayer amounts to a reward for non-compliance. However, if section 66(1a) 
is interpreted as discretionary, then the non-compliant taxpayer has no guarantee that they 
will be able to access the penalty and interest waiver unless they meet conditions set by the 
Commissioner in exercise of his or her discretion.  
4.1.2 Requirements of a valid voluntary disclosure under section 66(1a) 
The URA has issued a public notice on 5 October 2020 explaining the VDP under section 
66(1a). The public notice defined a voluntary disclosure and stated the requirement that it be 
‘in writing’ and be ‘complete and accurate’. It also outlined circumstances in which a 
voluntary disclosure would not be accepted, and laid out a procedure for applying for relief 
under the VDP (URA 2020c). From a reading of the law and public notice, the following are 
the requirements for an application to qualify for the VDP under section 66(1a): 
(1) The disclosure must be voluntary.
(2) The disclosure must be complete and accurate.
(3) The disclosure must not fall within one of the exceptions.
The disclosure must be voluntary 
The public notice states that: ‘Voluntary Disclosure occurs when a taxpayer, unprompted and 
of their own volition, comes forward to disclose their tax liabilities, misstatements or 
omissions in their tax declarations in order to return to a fully compliant status with respect to 
legal obligations’ (URA 2020c). The taxpayer must not have been prompted by any 
compliance action by URA such as: initiation of a tax investigation, request for tax 
information, tax advisory letter, tax health check/review, notice of audit, tax query, or 
compliance visit by URA officers (URA 2020c). Voluntariness of a disclosure is a key policy 
objective of the programme. If disclosures made by taxpayers prompted by compliance 
actions were to be accepted, there would be no incentive for taxpayers to correct past 
deficiencies until it was clear that they are going to be held accountable.57 The requirement 
of voluntariness is in line with the model tax amnesty decribed earlier. 
Whether a disclosure has been prompted by a compliance action is a question of fact and 
can be determined by examining the circumstances in which it was made. In the Canadian 
case of Worsfold v The Minister of National Revenue,58 the applicant was a shareholder and 
director in a company. The applicant’s VDP application relating to his personal affairs was 
56 Williams v The Minister of National Revenue (2011) FC 766  at Para 31. 
57 334156 Alberta Ltd v Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2006 FC 1133. 
58 Worsfold v The Minister of National Revenue (2012) FC 644. 
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filed an hour after the CRA notified the company of an impending audit. There was evidence 
that the applicant had been contemplating a VDP application for several months and had 
even discussed it with tax lawyers. The court considered that the chain of events showed 
that the VDP application was not prompted by the impending company audit.  
The fact that a taxpayer does not perceive a particular action by URA as a compliance action 
is irrelevant where a reasonable person would perceive it as such. In the Canadian case of 
Williams v The Minister of National Revenue,59 the applicant, a non-filer, had been in contact 
with the Non-Filer Division of the CRA for several years. When his VDP application was 
rejected, he argued that he did not perceive the notices to file an income tax return as 
enforcement activity. Court upheld the rejection, noting that, ‘[a] reasonable person would 
conclude, having regard to the extent of non-compliance, the repeated issuance of Notices to 
File and the communications with the Non-Filers Division of CRA that enforcement activity 
was underway’.60 
In order to preclude a voluntary disclosure, compliance action must relate to the tax type and 
tax period being disclosed. The public notice states: ‘A taxpayer who is subject to ongoing 
compliance action in respect of a tax head and a particular tax period may nonetheless make 
voluntary disclosure in relation to a different tax head in the same or different period or the 
same tax head in a different period provided that the information that is disclosed would not 
inevitably have been discovered by the ongoing compliance action’ (URA 2020c). Therefore, 
a taxpayer who is under audit for say, non-remittance of employee payroll deductions, may 
make a valid voluntary disclosure relating to VAT provided that there is no correlation 
between the two taxes. This is a question of fact. Where there is a link between the two 
taxes, the VDP may be rejected. In Robinson v Her Majesty the Queen,61 the CRA notified 
the applicant of an impending employee payroll audit. The applicant made a VDP application 
with respect to unpaid income tax and goods and services tax (GST). The court upheld the 
rejection of the VDP application because the applicant failed to show that the payroll audit 
would not have disclosed the non-filings in income tax and GST.  
The disclosure must be complete and accurate 
The requirement that a voluntary disclosure be complete and accurate stems from the 
requirement that taxpayer declarations to the URA be complete and accurate.62 In the 
Canadian case of Palonek v The Minister of National Revenue,63 the CRA rejected a VDP 
application on grounds of incompleteness. This rejection was upheld by the court, which 
noted that the taxpayer’s duty to submit complete information was ‘not different from the duty 
that any taxpayer has with respect to income tax returns, i.e. full disclosure of all income from 
all sources’.64 Accordingly, an applicant should not limit the disclosure to select errors or 
omissions or to specific taxation years or reporting periods. The VDP is premised on the idea 
of a fresh start for the taxpayer. Allowing incomplete disclosure would enable a taxpayer to 
cherry-pick instances of non-compliance where they fear discovery, and ignore instances 
where they think discovery is less likely.  
Where the VDP application is deliberately incomplete in some material aspect, the partial 
disclosure may be used by the URA to assess the taxpayer and levy penalties or initiate 
59 Williams v The Minister of National Revenue (2011) FC 766. 
60 Williams v The Minister of National Revenue (2011) FC 766 at Para 20. 
61 Robinson v Her Majesty the Queen (2009) FC 795. 
62 Sections 49 and 49A of the TPCA. 
63 Palonek v The Minister of National Revenue (2007) FCA 281. 
64 Palonek v The Minister of National Revenue (2007) FCA 281 at Para 11. 
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prosecution for non-compliance. In the US case of Shotwell Mfg. Co. v United States,65 the 
executives of a company made a VDP application in 1948 disclosing failure to pay taxes. 
However, it was subsequently discovered that the disclosure was incomplete and they were 
prosecuted for tax evasion. Part of the evidence used against them came from their 
purported disclosure, and they objected to this as contrary to the right against self-
incrimination. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that no bona fide honest disclosure had 
ever been made, and the purported disclosure was a further effort to perpetrate a fraud on 
the government, therefore admission of the evidence so obtained did not violate petitioners' 
privilege against self-incrimination. The court observed that: ‘What is involved here is not a 
case of incriminatory evidence having been induced by the Government, but one in which 
petitioners attempted to hoodwink the Government into what would have been a flagrant 
misapplication of its voluntary disclosure policy’.66  
The VDP application ought to cover all relevant tax heads where there has been non-
compliance. In the Kenyan case of Awal Limited v Commissioner of Investigations and 
Enforcement67 the appellant, while under investigation for VAT, made a voluntary disclosure 
regarding income tax. The VAT investigations uncovered additional invoices that had not 
been declared as part of the VDP application. Court held income from the sale of goods 
subjected to VAT ought to have been disclosed as part of the VDP application, which was 
therefore incomplete. Findings on investigation on VAT therefore had effect on income 
declared. 
The disclosure must not fall within the listed exceptions 
A number of circumstances in which a VDP application will not be accepted are listed in the 
public notice (URA 2020). These exceptions focus on excluding information that the URA 
was already aware of, or that is easily discoverable. In the South African case of Purveyors v 
SARS,68 Purveyors was liable for import VAT in 2015 but failed to report and remit such 
amounts of VAT to SARS. In 2016, Purveyors engaged with SARS conveying no more than 
a broad overview of the facts. In February 2017 SARS advised Purveyors that they had to 
pay the tax with penalties. Purveyors subsequently applied to SARS under the VDP arguing 
that it had received no notice of audit or investigation therefore the application was voluntary, 
despite SARS’ prior knowledge of the issue. SARS argued that the disclosure must be of 
information or facts of which SARS had been unaware. Court held that: ‘the purpose of the 
VDP provisions is to incentivise errant taxpayers to come clean. That purpose would be 
defeated if the only circumstance under which a VDP application were to be held as 
involuntary was the receipt of a notice of an audit... When applicant made the VDP 
application it was obviously aware that SARS knew of its default. It in fact disclosed nothing 
new the application was therefore not a valid one. There can be no disclosure to a person if 
the other already has knowledge thereof: certainly not in the present statutory context’.69 The 
application of the VDP should therefore be done with consideration of its purpose, which is 
encouraging the previously non-compliant to become compliant. The following are the lists of 
exceptions to the Ugandan VDP. 
(a) Principal tax
The VDP remission does not apply to the principal tax due, as it remains due and payable
even when the VDP application has been accepted. This is in accordance to section 67 of
65 Shotwell Mfg. Co. v United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963). 
66 Shotwell Mfg. Co. v United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963) at p 371. 
67 Awal Limited v Commissioner of Investigations and Enforcement Income Tax Appeal No. 26 of 2017. 
68 Purveyors South Africa v SARS Case No: 61689/2019. 
69 Purveyors South Africa v SARS Case No: 61689/2019 Para 13. 
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the TPCA, which provides that the amount of any tax due and payable under a tax law by a 
taxpayer is not abated by reason only of the compounding of such offence under section 66. 
(b) Penalties and interest already assessed
Where interest and penalties have already been assessed by the URA, a VDP application is
not possible. This exclusion would apply even when the taxpayer was not aware that
penalties and interest had already been assessed – for example, where communication has
been made to a registered email address that the taxpayer had ceased to use.70 This is
because the application would no longer be considered necessary as the URA has already
detected the non-compliance, and issued interest and penalties in that regard.
(c) Disclosure that relates to routine errors
A disclosure relating to routine errors, such as arithmetical errors, which would routinely
generate an assessment even if not disclosed, is not considered a voluntary disclosure (URA
2020c). This stems from an understanding of the VDP as an exceptional compliance effort
that supports other efforts at compliance, and not a means of allowing taxpayers avoid
obvious liabilities.
(d) Where information is in the public domain
The public notice excludes from voluntary disclosures ‘information available in the public
domain regarding the specific taxpayer’s or a related taxpayer’s potential involvement in tax
non-compliance’. There have been instances in which URA has relied on information in the
public domain to assess taxes. In 2016 URA relied on information revealed during a fraud
case filed by the telecom giant, MTN, against some of its staff to issue a four-year tax
assessment (The East African 2017). URA relies on information in newspapers and lifestyle
magazines in identifying and assessing HNWIs (Kangave et al. 2018). This exclusion can be
presumed to apply to such information as well. This exclusion is premised on the fact that the
URA would have detected the non-compliance without a disclosure by the taxpayer.
(e) Where an associate of the taxpayer is under audit or investigation
A VDP application will be rejected where an associate of the applicant is under audit or
investigation and that audit or investigation would inevitably have led to what is being
disclosed (URA 2020c). An associate is defined under the tax laws as ‘any person, not being
an employee, who acts in accordance with the directions, requests, suggestions, or wishes of
another person’.71 Where a person, either alone or together with an associate or associates,
controls 50 per cent or more of the voting power in a company, they are associates of that
company.72 This exclusion applies because the associate is presumed to be aware of the
audit, and therefore of the fact that their non-compliance is about to be discovered.
This particular exclusion will be challenging to operationalise. A taxpayer may not necessarily 
be aware of a compliance action against an associate. Where a company is part of a large 
group of companies, it is possible that management of one company may not have 
knowledge of, or regular interaction with, other associated companies. In Canada, it has 
been held that the mere existence of a relationship is not sufficient to support an inference 
that information of an impending or ongoing compliance action against an associate was 
communicated to the applicant. The facts must clearly suggest that this communication did in 
fact take place, prompting the VDP application.73 
70 Section 16(1) of the Electronic Transactions Act, 2011. 
71 Section 3(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
72 Section 3(2)(e) of the Income Tax Act. 
73 Charky v Attorney General of Canada 2010 FC 1327. 
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Further, determining that particular information would inevitably have been discovered is 
difficult. The link between the compliance action against one company and information 
disclosed by a related company must be clear and should not involve speculation in order for 
it to be rejected. In AIMO v The Attorney General of Canada,74 the CRA entered the name of 
a company that was a shareholder of AIMO into its electronic registry of companies to be 
audited, with a focus on withholding of tax on dividends paid to it, which AIMO had not been 
doing. AIMO’s sole director was aware of the impending shareholder’s audit. A few months 
later AIMO applied under VDP disclosing its failure to remit taxes on dividend payments. 
CRA rejected it on grounds that the enforcement action against AIMO’s shareholders was 
likely to have uncovered the information disclosed. Court held that the link between the 
intended audit and AIMO’s disclosure was tenuous, and it required speculation to conclude 
that the actions taken against the shareholder would have led to the discovery of AIMO’s 
non-compliance.   
The mere fact that a VDP applicant is a director in a company that has been notified of an 
impending audit does not invalidate the application. First it would have to be proven that as a 
director they were made aware of the impending company audit, and second it would have to 
be shown that information disclosed would inevitably have been discovered by the audit. In 
4053893 Canada Inc v The Minister of National Revenue,75 the sole owner of the appellant 
company had been non-compliant in filing his personal tax return. In 2016 the CRA 
communicated with him regarding this non-compliance, during which he mentioned that his 
company was still active. In 2017, the company applied under VDP, but CRA rejected it 
because of the earlier communication. Court rejected the CRA’s argument, noting that the 
mere existence of a relationship between taxpayers was insufficient. The CRA had to 
address how enforcement action against one taxpayer would likely uncover information that 
is the subject of voluntary disclosure by another taxpayer. The fact that the director was the 
sole owner of the company was considered inadequate. In Poon v Her Majesty the Queen76 
a company, APS received a notification to file returns. Subsequently, its director made a 
voluntary disclosure application regarding his personal income earned from APS and other 
sources. The court overturned the CRA’s rejection of his VDP application because it could 
not explain how enforcement action against APS would have led to discovery of what was 
disclosed.  
It is therefore submitted that, as in Canada, this exclusion should be interpreted narrowly – 
the URA should be required to establish how they would have discovered the non-
compliance of the applicant through investigation or audit of the associate. 
4.1.3 Procedure of applying for the VDP 
The taxpayer applies by filling in a Voluntary Disclosure Form (VDF), admitting to the offence 
and requesting to be considered under the VDP. The VDF may be completed and signed by 
the taxpayer,77 tax representative78 or tax agent.79 The VDF requires the applicant to submit 
details identifying them, including their name and Taxpayer Identification Number. 
Anonymous VDP applications where the taxpayer only reveals themselves after a guarantee 
of acceptance could be problematic. Anonymous disclosures may be subject to abuse by 
advisors making generic disclosures without an underlying taxpayer, and subsequently 
holding these in inventory to be used later if a client with similar deficiencies became a 
74 AIMO v The Attorney General of Canada 2010 FC 1070. 
75 4053893 Canada Inc v The Minister of National Revenue 2019 FC 51. 
76 Poon v Her Majesty the Queen (2009) FC 432. 
77 Section 66(2) of the TPCA. 
78 Section 14(1) of the TPCA. 
79 Section 8(3)(b) of the TPCA. 
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subject of audit. That way they could claim that the date of the disclosure was prior to the 
audit, an occurrence that took place in Canada, leading to a revision of the procedures 
relating to no-name disclosures (Friedman 2016). Anonymous disclosures also create room 
for unnecessary litigation over the VDP, as the URA may inadvertently accept VDPs of 
taxpayers whose non-compliance they are already aware of.80 Upon submission of the 
application, it is reviewed and subsequently accepted or rejected. Where it is accepted, the 
applicant receives a Voluntary Disclosure Certificate signed by the Commissioner General. 
There are no timelines given in which the VDP application is to be considered. 
5  Strengths of the Ugandan VDP 
Unlike previous amnesties, this is a permanent VDP in line with the model tax amnesty 
previously described. Taxpayers in Uganda generally have little trust in the URA (Ali et al. 
2014). Despite considerable efforts to build a better working relationship and trust with the 
citizens, a lot remains to be done (The Observer 2020). In this low-trust environment, it will 
take time to convince the public that the VDP is a genuine compliance measure from which 
they can benefit. Taxpayers may be afraid, and perceive the measure as a ruse to get non-
compliant people to reveal themselves. This lack of trust in the tax authority reportedly 
contributed to underpeformance of the 2018 Ghanaian temporary tax amnesty (CNBC Africa 
2019). A time-bound amnesty does not allow time to build trust that the VDP is actually being 
administered as communicated.  
In line with the model tax amnesty, the Ugandan VDP is accompanied by other compliance 
and enforcement measures. First, renewed effort has been made to combat corruption in the 
tax revenue authority since early 2020 (The Independent 2020; The Observer 2020a). 
Reducing the likelihood of corruption as a means of escaping liability will encourage 
voluntary compliance through the VDP. Second, URA has introduced new compliance 
mechanisms, such as Digital Tax Stamps (DTS) and the Electronic Fiscal Receipting and 
Invoicing System (EFRIS). DTS were launched in November 2019, and are used to track and 
trace goods subject to excise duty and to combat illicit trade in contraband goods (The 
Independent 2019; URA 2020b). EFRIS will be used by URA to monitor transactions of VAT-
registered taxpayers; it will be launched in January 2021 (Asingwire 2020). These 
compliance measures support the VDP by increasing the possibility of detection, thereby 
encouraging taxpayers to take advantage of the VDP. 
The Ugandan tax amnesty requires the taxpayer to voluntarily disclose their non-compliance, 
and is not available to those who do not disclose and those whose non-compliance is already 
known to the tax authority. This is in line with the model tax amnesty. As already noted, some 
previous amnesties in Uganda, such as the one in 2008, were blanket amnesties, applicable 
to all taxpayers without the need for any action on their part. The current VDP requires 
taxpayers to disclose their non-compliance to the URA, allowing for intelligence- and data-
gathering that may be useful when designing future compliance initiatives. Taxpayers whose 
non-compliance is already known are excluded, because the URA is able to recover that tax, 
interest and penalties owed. The Ugandan VDP does not accept anonymous disclosures, 
which is in line with the model tax amnesty. 
Further in line with the model tax amnesty, the Ugandan VDP grants relief for the taxpayer 
from prosecution, penalties and interest. The principal tax owed remains due and payable, 
and is explicitly excluded by the public notice. Relief from prosecution is an important relief, 
80 See e.g. Karia v Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2005 FC 639. 
31 
because tax offences contain a criminal element and are prosecutable. Granting relief from 
penalties and interest alone, without including the principal tax owed, is helpful. Relief from 
the unpaid principal amount owed would likely be perceived as unfair by compliant 
taxpayers, and could incentivise non-compliance.  
The URA has put considerable effort into communicating the VDP to the public. Following the 
public notice issued on 5 October 2020, the URA has continued to engage with the public on 
the subject through social media, webinars and mainstream media. The URA Commissioner 
General continues to highlight the VDP in virtually every public appearance, noting that it is 
available to all taxpayers who meet the conditions publicised. 
6  Limitations of the Ugandan VDP and 
recommendations 
6.1 Use of public notices instead of practice notes 
The details relating to administration of the VDP have been communicated to the public 
through public notices in newspapers and on the URA website, instead of through practice 
notes. Practice notes are communications from the URA that are published in the Gazette, 
setting out the Commissioner’s understanding of the application of a provision in a tax law.81 
Crucially, practice notes are provided for by the TPCA, and are binding on the Commissioner 
until they are revoked.82 As already observed, during the 2007 tax amnesty, the URA issued 
a practice note laying out details of how the amnesty would be administered (URA 2007). 
Public notices, on the other hand, have no statutory basis, and are usually used to 
communicate general information to the public, such as reminders. While it is likely that 
courts would find such public notices binding on URA in certain circumstances, based on the 
common law doctrines of estoppel and legitimate expectation,83 the use of a practice note 
would inspire more confidence in the public that URA will be bound by its communication 
(Becker et al. 2020). 
In line with the principle of clear communication in the model tax amnesty developed in 
section 4, it is recommended that URA issue a practice note laying out the procedure for 
administration of the VDP. This would increase trust among taxpayers that the VDP is a 
genuine compliance measure, and that they can benefit from it. 
6.2 Secret investigations 
It remains unclear what happens where an investigation or audit is ongoing in the URA, but 
the taxpayer has not yet been notified. In certain instances, such as where there is a risk that 
a taxpayer may destroy evidence of non-compliance, URA may be compelled to carry out 
secret investigations without informing the taxpayer. If the taxpayer makes a VDP application 
in such circumstances, the outcome remains unclear. Where considerable manpower and 
effort has been expended in an ongoing secret investigation, it would seem absurd to allow a 
taxpayer to escape prosecution, penalties and interest by applying under a VDP. On the 
other hand, the taxpayer’s right to procedural fairness and the need to generate public trust 
81 Sections 44(1) and 44(2) of the TPCA. 
82 Section 44(3) of the TPCA. 
83 e.g. in NSSF v URA High Court Civil Appeal No. 29 of 2020 court found URA bound by a guidance it had issued to a
taxpayer which did not amount to a Private Ruling.
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in the VDP would suggest it might be better to accept the application. Courts in the US 
regularly hold that no valid VDP application occurs when there is an ongoing investigation, 
even if the taxpayer is unaware of it. In Lapides v United States,84 the taxpayer voluntarily 
disclosed his unreported income in May 1951, but, unbeknownst to him, the tax authority had 
assigned an officer to undertake a preliminary investigation of his affairs in April of the same 
year. The court held that the VDP application was not valid stating: ‘The mere fact that the 
Department did not inform him and that he did not know that an investigation had been 
begun was irrelevant… For the issue as to the timeliness of the disclosure depended, as 
pointed out above, on the fact of a prior investigation, not on the appellant’s absence of 
knowledge or belief as to that fact’. 
Similarly, in White v United States,85 the taxpayer disclosed his fraud when an investigation 
into his tax affairs had already commenced without his knowledge. The court rejected the 
validity of the voluntary disclosure, because it was made after the investigation was 
underway.86 A similar view was held in other cases.87  
It is recommended that the list of exclusions from the VDP be amended to include situations 
where the URA can prove that it was conducting investigations. The burden of proof must 
remain on the tax authority to prove that it was indeed conducting these investigations, and 
that non-compliance would have been discovered. This approach is recommended because 
it is generally elaborately designed tax evasion schemes that necessitate secret 
investigations.  
6.3 VDP does not cater for different forms of non-compliance 
As described in part 1, various segments of the population engage in different forms of non-
compliance for different reasons. HNWIs, multinational entities and large local corporations 
generally engage in intentional non-compliance. These firms can afford to hire some of the 
best tax experts in the country – their non-compliance is often intentional, and may involve 
considerable efforts on their part to avoid detection. On the other hand, taxpayers in the 
informal sector may engage in non-compliance due to limited knowledge of the tax regime, 
including a lack of understanding of their actual liability and how to become compliant (Joshi 
et al. 2014). 
The Ugandan VDP does not distinguish between these two broad groups of taxpayers. The 
same relief is available to taxpayers who engage in non-compliance intentionally and to 
those who are non-compliant due to limited knowledge of the tax regime. This is unfair to the 
compliant taxpayers and appears to reward intentional non-compliance.  
It is therefore recommended that the Ugandan VDP be transformed into a two-stream VDP, 
similar to the new Canadian VDP. Taxpayers with a gross turnover of USh35 billion or more 
who take advantage of the VDP can benefit from non-prosecution and a waiver of penalties, 
but have to pay interest due. Taxpayers with a gross turnover below USh35 billion who take 
advantage of the VDP can have the same relief and benefit from an interest waiver. Other 
factors, such as the extent to which non-compliance was intentional, and efforts involved in 
avoiding detection, can also be considered. This would make the VDP more equitable in line 
with the model tax amnesty developed in section 3 of this paper. 
84 Lapides v United States, 215 F.2d 253 (1954). 
85 White v United States, 194 F.2d. 215 (5th Cir. 1952). 
86 White v United States, 194 F.2d. 215 (5th Cir. 1952) at Para 10. 
87 United States v Levy, 99 F. Supp. 529 (1951) and United States v Lustig, 163 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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6.4 VDP’s interaction with other laws remains unclear 
Tax non-compliance may sometimes involve breaching other legislation. Offences in the 
Penal Code Act, such as conspiracy to defeat a tax law88 and making false documents,89 
may be committed in an effort to evade taxes. In such instances the compounding of the tax 
offence under the TPCA would seem to cover these offences under the Penal Code Act 
under the rule against double jeopardy.90  
However, there may be instances where the secondary offence is operated by a different 
authority. For example, taxpayers engaging in tax evasion may also be in breach of the Anti-
Money Laundering Act, 2013, which is operated by the Financial Intelligence Authority. A 
bank’s tax non-compliance may also involve non-compliance in its reporting requirements to 
its regulator, Bank of Uganda. In such an instance, while the bank is able to avoid 
prosecution, interest and penalties for tax non-compliance under the VDP, it risks heavy 
penalties if the information is shared with the regulator. Similarly, tax practitioners who may 
have aided in the non-compliance may be afraid of being reported to their regulatory bodies 
and penalised for unethical behaviour if their activities are revealed in a VDP application. 
They also risk being deregistered from the list of tax agents recognised by the URA under 
the TPCA.91 The current VDP mechanism does not shield them from this. This is not just an 
academic question. When tax amnesties were first offered in South Africa, many tax 
practitioners advised taxpayers not to apply on the grounds that there was no exemption 
from penalties under their Financial Intelligence Centre Act, which would have penalised the 
tax advisors. An exemption was subsequently published and the tax amnesty picked up 
(Junpath et al. 2016).  
The URA can commit not to share any of the information that is submitted under the VDP. 
The duty of confidentiality for tax information can be relied on for this.92 However, this may 
not be sufficiently reassuring. It is therefore recommended that an exemption similar to that 
in South Africa be offered, such that beneficiaries of the VDP do not risk penalties from other 
public bodies.  
6.5 Absence of timelines 
There is no timeline within which URA is required to respond to the submission of a VDF. 
This is a challenge, as it creates uncertainty for taxpayers as they await the outcome of their 
application. A clear timeline within which to expect a response is necessary.  
There is also no clear timeline for the conclusion of an audit or other compliance action. This 
may create a challenge in determining whether or not a VDP application can be made. For 
example, a taxpayer may receive a request for information from URA and submit it. After six 
months the taxpayer may not have received any follow-up from URA regarding the 
information submitted. The taxpayer would be unsure whether or not they can submit a VDP 
application relating to the same information. It needs to be clarified that where URA has lost 
interest in a particular compliance action by not following up on it for a period of time, such as 
six months, the taxpayer can make a valid VDP application. 
88 Section 392(a) of the Penal Code Act Cap 120 applied in Basajabalaba v Kakande [2013] UGHCCRD 19. 
89 Section 345 of the Penal Code Act Cap 120; See for example Ndimwibo v URA [2017] UGCOMMC 39. 
90 Article 28(9) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995. 
91 Section 13(3)(d) provides that the Tax Agent Registration Committee may deregister a tax agent who prepares tax 
returns that are false in material particulars. 
92 Section 47 of the TPCA. 
34 
Finally, there are no timelines to cater for a situation where the taxpayer is required to submit 
documents when the original VDP application has insufficient information. The Canadian 
VDP provides for 90 days within which to submit any additional documents. It is 
recommended that URA adopts a clear timeline within which to submit additional documents. 
6.6 Allowance for minor errors 
There is no provision for a situation where the taxpayer makes a minor error in their VDP 
application that is subsequently discovered through an audit. A VDP application must be 
complete and accurate in order to be valid. Where it is subsequently discovered that the 
application contained inaccuracies, the Voluntary Disclosure Certificate will be revoked. 
However, it is possible for a taxpayer to make minor errors in their VDP application that may 
subsequently be discovered. Such errors ought not to result in a revocation of the Voluntary 
Disclosure Certificate. 
In Canada, minor omissions or deficiencies in the completeness of a disclosure will not, in 
and of themselves, render the disclosure invalid. However, if the disclosure is found to 
contain ‘substantial errors or omissions’, the disclosure may not qualify as a valid disclosure. 
In these cases, what constitutes a substantial error is to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis’ (Friedman 2016). It is recommended that URA adopt a similar approach. 
6.7 VDP applications that result in a refund position 
The public notice is silent on situations where the VDP application places the taxpayer in a 
refund position. A taxpayer might have undisclosed income from transactions that are zero-
rated for the purposes of VAT. The taxpayer could make a VDP application ostensibly of the 
undisclosed income; however, the zero-rated transactions could place the taxpayer in a net 
refund position. The taxpayer could have been put off from claiming this refund by the 
penalties and interest that would accrue, which the acceptance of the VDP would do away 
with.  
One of the main purposes of the VDP is to raise revenue, therefore applications that result in 
refund positions ought to be excluded. As previously noted, the South African VDP explicitly 
excludes applications that result in a refund position. It is recommended that the URA adopt 
this position, making VDP applications that place the taxpayer in a refund position invalid. 
6.8 Repeated VDP applications 
The public notice does not have a limit on the number of VDP applications that a taxpayer 
can make. This leaves the programme open to abuse – similar in nature to that of repeated 
tax amnesties inadvertently encouraging non-compliance, where the taxpayer deliberately 
engages in evasion because they intend to benefit from a VDP.  
It is recommended that taxpayers be allowed to make only one VDP application, after which 
they cannot be allowed to make another application except where they could not have 
discovered the non-compliance before the initial VDP. The VDP should be understood as a 
quid pro quo arrangement, where the URA offers relief from penalty and interest, and the 
taxpayer makes a bona fide effort to analyse their historical tax affairs to identify and disclose 
all instances of non-compliance. The taxpayer making the VDP application has the duty to 
make all inquiries that a reasonable person would make to determine that all previous 
deficiencies in reporting have been discovered and are disclosed. Such an approach can be 
adopted through issuance of a practice note to that effect, without a need to amend section 
66(1a) of the TPCA. 
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7  Conclusion 
Tax amnesties have been used around the world with varying degrees of success. While 
they have significant benefits, they come at the risk of considerable costs. The model 
amnesty developed in section 3 attempts to ensure the benefits of the amnesty are 
maximised and the costs are minimised. The Ugandan VDP is an innovative approach to 
taxpayer compliance. The current VDP presents a useful opportunity for those engaged in 
evasion and other forms of non-compliance to rectify their status. It provides a permanent tax 
amnesty for the largely non-compliant population. It matches up to the model tax amnesty in 
a number of ways. However, as currently designed, the Ugandan VDP has a number of 
limitations that need to be dealt with for the benefits to be maximised and the costs 
minimised. More research is needed to assess the benefits of the VDP through empirical 
analysis of data.  
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